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Islamic "radicalization" also finds its expression in non-violent acts of defiance and statements of difference, such as the wearing of the hijab or head scarf and other distinct cultural practices. These symbolic actions produce discomfiture among the majority West European citizenry, as these are also seen as aggressive rejections of Western civilization.
Additionally, these developments help explain the rise in popularity of theories of civilizational clashes between the West and Islam (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 2003) . Although there is a vast body of work on how Islamic radicalization functions, and an even larger literature on the dangers it poses, the development of radicalization is often assumed to have emerged in a socio-economic and political vacuum. Implicit in these analyses is the attribution of violence to the innate nature of (a monolithic) Islamic mindset. The hatred for the West by some Muslim groups is treated as a given; hence conflict with the West necessarily follows. Some Western writers, such as Lewis (2003) , also depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pride about their historical decline, which fills some among them with a virulent hatred for the West. Huntington (1996) states that:
"the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power" (Huntington 1996: 217) .
The problem with these 'culturalist' views is that it treats global religons, such as Islam, as monolithic, whereas in reality there are many faces of Islam across both historical time and at the present. Secondly, and more importantly, individual identity is regarded as a singular phenomenon, ignoring the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess (Sen, 2008) . Thus, it is conceivable for an individual to be simultaneously a Muslim, a European citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as someone who respects difference and human rights. Furthermore, culture is not immutable; rather it evolves over time, and changes as material conditions alter. For example, compared to a century ago, few today would regard Catholicism or Confucianism as intrinsically inimical to capitalist development. It is important to note, however, that individual identification with group grievances is central to collective action surrounding Muslim radicalization.
The alternative explanation for disgruntled Muslim behaviour in Europe lies in wider socio-economic disadvantage, the theoretical underpinnings for which date back to Ted Gurr's (1970) classic work on relative deprivation as the source of rebellion. Stewart (2008) has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups face in European countries and worldwide (Muslims are a fifth or more of humanity). These range from economic discrimination in terms of jobs and lower incomes to under representation in public life. This phenomenon may be described as the horizontal inequalities that Muslims suffer from in contemporary Europe. Horizontal inequality is group-based inequality, rather than the inequality in an otherwise culturally or ethnically homogenous society; see Stewart (2000) on this. Muslim citizens in Europe are systematically poorer, suffer from greater unemployment and are less than proportionately represented in public life (Stewart, 2008) , in addition to the opprobrium their cultural identity attracts. In short, Muslims in Western Europe may be subject to an inequality of opportunity on account of their identity; something that produces systematic disadvantage in the sense of Roemer (1998) . (Mamdani 2004: 24) . A reference to Muslim people as a homogenous set of people, inherently prone to radicalization due to their religious beliefs, becomes the basis of cultural explanations for the rise of Islamic radicalization. As argued above, culture needs to be nuanced, the manner in which it evolves in response to material progress (or the lack of it) needs to be taken into account, as well as the fact that individual human beings have multiple cultural identities (Sen, 2008 
Identity and Collective Action
With regard to identity based collective action, it is convenient to begin with the political economy of altruism. This occurs when the donor derives utility or happiness from the utility of the recipient. Altruistic sensibilities also apply to those who espouse a cause, such as the well-being of the Muslim Ummah. Essentially, there are two forms of altruism. One is referred to as pure altruism. This is when the donor derives utility from the benefit of the recipient or the furtherance of a cause, but can obtain that utility passively because it does not necessarily require him to participate actively or directly. He is happy that a purpose is served, even when persons other than himself do the good deed. For example, individuals can be in favour of animal welfare, without actually paying into or participating in animal charities. They are happy that others do so. In this case, altruism is a public good, and as is well known there can be free riding on the public good (this is when we let others pay for the common good). Another form of altruism is known as impact philanthropy, see Duncan (2003) Secondly, we have the innovative approach to the economics of identity, as proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) . Their approach provides another view on why identities can become salient, and how the collective action problem, as described by Olson (1965) , is resolved. Individuals derive utility not just from consumption or identification with a cause, but also from their own behaviour that is in conformity to their sense of identity and the like minded behaviour of other members of the group they belong to; for example the performance of prayers by the individual and his co-religionists. Here the position that the group occupies in societal hierarchy is also crucial to their collective self-esteem. All of these factors (utility from identity based actions, similar actions by other group members, and the position of their group) enter an explicit utility function.
The individual not only derives utility from a vector of his own actions, but also similar actions of other like-minded individuals belonging to his group, and above all his own identity or self image, which in turn depends on the group's social standing. The last factor depends both on the group's economic disadvantage, and other factors such as the West's foreign policy towards the Muslim world. It can be argued, however, that low social standing may encourage individuals to abandon their primary identity in favour of other, less frowned upon, identities. These actions, however, would be insincere and based on strategic considerations. Also, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000) , it is possible to show that many such individuals may be deterred from this course of action by their peers. If another group member suffers disutility from other-identity based behaviour by another group member, they may lure the errant individual back to the fold, provided that the cost of doing so to themselves is not too large and is less than the loss inflicted on the deviant group member. This is more likely amongst poor but culturally homogenous communities suffering from widespread unemployment, and who live proximately to each other in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties (as in many metropolitan locations throughout Europe where Muslim families related to each other live cheek by jowl). Moreover, the dissident group may use this type of cooperative behaviour to solve the collective action problem, as described by Olson (1965) . Thus, group grievances become individual grievances, and individuals act upon their group grievances. It is not their own poverty that will necessarily drive individual membership of a radical group, but the disadvantage faced by the group at large. But most importantly, if theory of politicized collective identity explains the behaviour of ordinary group members, the economics of identity sheds light on the kind of intra-group dynamics which lead to increasingly widespread radicalized collective action.
Other disciplines in the social sciences (outside economics and political economy) have a longer history of emphasising the identification with a collective meaning of one-self.
Mirroring Akerlof and Kranton's importance of identity is the much earlier thought of Johan Galtung. He hypothesized that "aggression is most likely to arise in social positions of rank disequilibrium. In a system of individuals, it may take the form of a crime, in a system of groups the form of revolutions" (Galtung 1964:98) . Simon and Klandermaans (2001) What is the role of economic deprivation in the process of collective identity positioning?
There are three related concepts that can be applied here: relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequality; see Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) (Fetser and Soper, 2003) .
Following Glaeser (2005) we can think of the hate message against Muslim migrants as originating in a signal sent out by a politician, whose word (credibility) is not exactly the 'coin of the realm', because he may be deliberately sending out a false hate message as a cheap way of advancing his own popularity. Its attractiveness to the public will depend on their need for scapegoats and their own personal life experiences of these minority groups. Not all these signals will be believed: for example, some hate mongering politicians may be mistrusted, the better educated among the public may discount part of the message and others with greater knowledge of the minorities based upon personal interaction may similarly disregard this signal. 9 There is a cost to members of the public of verifying the veracity of the signal through a search process. Among the majority group there will be two different types of citizens. One group, the high cost type of individual, suffers both a greater perceived loss from Muslim dissidents and has a higher cost of verification of the signal. This is all the more so, if the search costs of verifying the signal entail an earlier lumpy fixed cost in education, say. These individuals are more likely to abandon the search for truth in favour of the hate message. Not only that, but they will clamour for public action against the object of their phobia. Also, after major riots involving (male) Muslim youths and terrorist attacks like the London bombings, all individuals from the majority community may believe the hate message for a time, effectively tarring all Muslims with the same (terrorist) brush. If enough voters believe the signal then public action will be called for, and Islamophobia or fear of Muslims acquires the nature of a public good. Note that because of the non-rivalled and nonexcludable nature of a public good, even those who do not derive utility from these actions are 'forced' to 'consume' the good and finance it via taxation. The state will be compelled to act at the taxpayers expense. These take the form of anti-Muslim and antiimmigrant legislation making it difficult for families to join relatives in Europe, integrationist nationalisation policies such as linguistic and cultural proficiency tests, the banning of head-scarves and veils (niqab or burqa). These policies are more likely to bear fruition in European nations where proportional representation is the rule, and coalition to the refusal of citizenship, access to public housing and even residence permits.
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom has a Muslim population of around 1.6 million, accounting for 2.8% of the national population, 46% of whom are British born, with a third aged below 
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Muslims are also under-represented in the political sphere: in 2005, less than 2.3% of members of parliament were from ethnic minority groups, which represent 10% of the population (Stewart 2008 Although permitted by law, the building of mosques is frequently met with opposition from Spanish society. Spanish converts are still the only credited advocates for Muslim rights in the country (Mehrotra 2005) .
A number of studies have documented the perception of discrimination: a field study in 2000 found that many Muslims in Spain complained of overt discrimination against their children by non-Muslim fellow pupils, who constantly stigmatised them as Moors.
Another study conducted by Gema Martin-Munoz found that many Moroccan immigrants, despite being well-educated, still met with difficulties when looking for qualified jobs, as "many Spaniards did not want to be seen on the same footing as a
Moor" (Mehrotra, 2005: 87) . Muslims in the Netherlands suffer from different dimensions of horizontal inequality. As far as access to the labour market is concerned, it has been noted that more than half of (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007: 1450) .
Conclusions
Muslim terrorism and radicalization has been viewed either as a type of criminal deviant behaviour arising from low individual opportunity costs of abandoning the productive labour market, or alternatively ascribed to the civilizational clash that Muslims will inevitably initiate. Group identity and low self-esteem has, in this approach, been relatively neglected, and where present, the possible multiplicity of individual identity (Muslim and other) has been ignored.
The country-based evidence in this paper shows that the radicalization does not occur in a social, political and economic vacuum; nor does it lend support to the 'culture talk' hypothesis, which singles out radicalization -and terrorism-as an intrinsic characteristic of Islamic practice. We have argued that politicised collective identity can account for the conflictual interaction between "fear" and "hatred" which largely underpins the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Western Europe. "Fear" is the anxiety felt by the majority; it is both the cause and the effect of fear-creating messages publicised by attention-seeking politicians. In this respect, there are differences across countries, British politicians have commendably counteracted feelings of fear following atrocities perpetrated by Muslims; the same is true for the governing Spanish leadership, although it met with less success. In the rest of Western Europe the conventional political elite has been less than robust in coming forward to allay excessive fearfulness of Islam. By "hatred", we refer to a set of behaviour and actions adopted by Muslim migrants, ranging from non-violent acts such as the wearing of hijabs to outright terrorism, all of which are part of a common attempt to signal difference and defiance to the majority community.
Horizontal inequalities suffered by Muslims, both worldwide and within Europe, are central to the formation of collective grievances. Perceptions regarding European foreign policies towards the Muslim world, which are ridden with double standards, are equally to blame. Majority versus minority inter-group conflict in Western European countries may also be regarded as a form of "positional" conflict, with two groups competing for material as well as symbolic resources. In this connection, a great deal of ink has been wasted in pointing out the relatively better social background of the perpetrators of violence, compared to the average position of the Muslim communities whose cause they espouse. The economics of identity and altruism, which we have sketched above, indicates that it is not an individual's poor personal circumstance that provides the spur towards direct action; rather it is the condition of the group. Akerlof and Kranton's (2000) approach provides further insights into intra-group dynamics, whereby leaders bent on confrontation have ways of preventing members from straying, something that is easier to monitor in poor and deprived communities.
Evidence from the country-based profiles further shows that discrimination against Muslims is rife, leading to conditions that are ripe for political mobilisation. Islamic leaders bent on confrontation are more able to produce adversarial attributions according to which "a specific out-group, an authority, or "the system", must be blamed for the group's predicament" (Simon and Klandermaans 2001: 325) . In turn, this allows further politicisation, as group members can then identify an external opponent group as "them" for what they are doing to "us" (Simon and Klandermaans 2001) . Finally, society is called upon to take sides either with one-group or with its opponent: in such context, rightwing politicians are able to harness their constituencies' fear of Muslims to increase their support. Our case studies illustrate that fear-mongering is greater in some European countries, and the UK is the most at variance with continental Europe in being less Islamophobic. Interestingly, terrorism in this context may become a vehicle in the power struggle to win the heart and minds of the general public; allegedly, terrorists "have even tried to provoke authorities (the police or the government) to engage in oppressive action or legislation, hoping that such oppression will generate anger and solidarity on the part of potential allies or the general public" (Simon and Klandermaans 2001: 329) .
Against the backdrop of a politicised Muslim identity, and substantial horizontal inequalities suffered by Muslims, domestic 'integrationist' policies aimed at 'moderate Muslims' are unlikely curb radicalization-let alone fight terrorism. Rather, they may backfire. American style integrationist policies are gaining favour in Europe, but these are doomed to failure unless the objects of the integrationist policies are also offered equality of opportunity, which means redressing Muslim horizontal inequalities. Furthermore, and quite crucially, if individuals have multiple identities as we suggest, then they are more likely to act on the basis of their other (European and non-Muslim) identities when they are less socio-economically deprived and less frowned upon. Radicalization is also unlikely to diminish unless the existing horizontal inequalities are narrowed, and the cultural opprobrium towards Islam that stems from and reinforces disadvantage, continues to be fomented by attention-seeking politicians. The presence of virulent Islamophobic messages (more common in some European countries) not only instils fear, but also elicits hatred, and can undo the pacific-integrationist effects of material progress amongst Muslims residing in Europe.
